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Abstract—This paper presents the mechanical verification of 
a simplified model of a rapid Byzantine-fault-tolerant self-
stabilizing protocol for distributed clock synchronization 
systems.  This protocol does not rely on any assumptions 
about the initial state of the system except for the presence 
of sufficient good nodes, thus making the weakest possible 
assumptions and producing the strongest results.  This 
protocol tolerates bursts of transient failures, and 
deterministically converges within a time bound that is a 
linear function of the self-stabilization period.  A simplified 
model of the protocol is verified using the Symbolic Model 
Verifier (SMV) [1].  The system under study consists of 4 
nodes, where at most one of the nodes is assumed to be 
Byzantine faulty.  The model checking effort is focused on 
verifying correctness of the simplified model of the protocol 
in the presence of a permanent Byzantine fault as well as 
confirmation of claims of determinism and linear 
convergence with respect to the self-stabilization period.  
Although model checking results of the simplified model of 
the protocol confirm the theoretical predictions, these results 
do not necessarily confirm that the protocol solves the 
general case of this problem.  Modeling challenges of the 
protocol and the system are addressed.  A number of 
abstractions are utilized in order to reduce the state space.1 2 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of self-stabilizing distributed computation was 
first presented in a classic paper by Dijkstra [2].  In that 
paper, he speculated whether it would be possible for a set 
of machines to stabilize their collective behavior in spite of 
unknown initial conditions and distributed control.  A 
fundamental criterion in the design of a robust distributed 
system is to provide the capability of tolerating and 
potentially recovering from failures that are not predictable 
in advance.  Overcoming such failures is most suitably 
addressed by tolerating Byzantine faults [3].  There are 
many algorithms that address permanent faults [4], where 
the issue of transient failures is either ignored or 
inadequately addressed.  There are many efficient Byzantine 
clock synchronization algorithms that are based on 
assumptions on initial synchrony of the nodes [4, 5] or 
existence of a common pulse at the nodes, e.g. the first 
protocol in [6].  There are many clock synchronization 
algorithms that are based on randomization and, therefore, 
are non-deterministic, e.g. the second protocol in [6]. 
Solving these special cases is insufficient to claim that an 
algorithm is self-stabilizing.  The main challenges associated 
with self-stabilization are the complexity of the design and 
the proof of correctness of the protocol.  Another difficulty 
is achieving an efficient convergence time for the proposed 
self-stabilizing protocol.  Typically, verification of a 
protocol is conducted by the composition of a paper-and-
pencil proof.  Verification of such proofs is another 
challenge associated with self-stabilization, especially as the 
complexity of the protocol increases.  Such proofs are error 
prone.  One recent work in this area is the algorithm 
developed by Daliot et al [7] called the Byzantine self-
stabilization pulse synchronization (BSS-Pulse-Synch) 
protocol.  A flaw in BSS-Pulse-Synch protocol was found 
and documented in a report by Malekpour et al. [8].  Such 
flaws are harder to pinpoint in the proof argument than 
finding a counterexample via simulation or model checking. 
 
Another technique sometimes used to verify the correctness 
of a design is based on extensive simulation but it too can 
miss significant errors when the number of possible states is 
very large.  Simulation of specific scenarios requires proper 
set up of the system for each case.  As the number of cases 
to be examined increases, this process becomes impractical. 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20080013512 2019-08-30T04:07:37+00:00Z
 2 
Model checking is a method for mechanically verifying 
finite-state concurrent systems.  Specifications about the 
system are expressed as temporal logic formulas, and 
efficient symbolic algorithms are used to traverse the model 
defined by the system and check if the specification holds or 
not.  The verification procedure is an exhaustive search of 
the state space of the design.  As a result, model checking is 
a viable means for mechanically verifying the claims of a 
distributed clock synchronization protocol.  Model checking 
also provides insight into the behavior of the system even if 
it cannot fully explore the entire state space.  Therefore, 
model checking is a practical alternative for accessing 
correctness of a protocol and proving correctness of a 
protocol instance. 
 
This paper presents model checking efforts in support of the 
claims of a rapid Byzantine-fault-tolerant self-stabilizing 
protocol for distributed clock synchronization systems [9, 
10].  In particular, this effort encompasses the verification of 
correctness of a simplified model of the protocol by 
confirming that a candidate system self-stabilizes from any 
state and tolerates bursts of transient failures in the presence 
of permanent Byzantine faulty nodes.  A permanent 
Byzantine faulty node is a node with arbitrarily malicious 
behavior.  This effort, furthermore, includes the verification 
of claims of determinism and linear convergence of the 
simplified model of the protocol with respect to the self-
stabilization period and in the presence of permanent 
Byzantine faulty nodes.  Although model checking results of 
the simplified model of the protocol are promising, these 
results do not necessarily imply that the protocol solves the 
general case of this problem. 
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Figure 1.  A 4-node system. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the system under study consists of 4 
nodes, where 3 of the nodes are assumed to be good and one 
of the nodes is Byzantine faulty.  Toward this objective, a 
number of abstractions and reduction techniques are devised 
to reduce the state space.  Also, in order to further reduce 
the state space to a more manageable size, system 
parameters are reduced to their minimal values.  The amount 
of memory needed for the construction of the Binary 
Decision Diagram (BDD) readily reaches the 4GB available 
after construction of the state space.  Therefore, model 
checking of larger and more complex systems poses a 
greater challenge. 
2. THE PROTOCOL 
A distributed system is defined to be self-stabilizing if, from 
an arbitrary state and in the presence of bounded number of 
Byzantine faults, it is guaranteed to reach a legitimate state 
in a finite amount of time and remain in a legitimate state as 
long as the number of Byzantine faults are within a specific 
bound.  A legitimate state is a state where all good clocks in 
the system are synchronized within a given precision bound. 
 
The self-stabilization problem has two facets.  First, it is 
inherently event-driven and, second, it is time-driven.  
Most attempts at solving the self-stabilization problem have 
focused only on the event-driven aspect of this problem.  
The protocol presented here properly merges the time and 
event driven aspects of this problem in order to self-stabilize 
the system in a gradual and yet timely manner.  Furthermore, 
this protocol is based on the concept of a continual vigilance 
of the state of the system in order to maintain and guarantee 
its stabilized status, and a periodic reaffirmation of nodes by 
declaring their internal status.  Finally, initialization and/or 
reintegration are not treated as special cases.  These 
scenarios are regarded as inherent parts of this self-
stabilizing protocol. 
 
The self-stabilization events are captured at a node via a 
selection function that is based on received valid messages 
from other nodes.  When such an event occurs, it is said that 
a node has accepted or an accept event has occurred.  In 
order to achieve self-stabilization, the nodes communicate 
by exchanging two self-stabilization messages labeled 
Resync and Affirm.  The Resync message reflects the time-
driven aspect of this self-stabilization protocol, while the 
Affirm message reflects the event-driven aspect of it.  The 
Resync message is transmitted when a node realizes that the 
system is no longer stabilized or as a result of a 
resynchronization timeout.  The Affirm message is 
transmitted periodically and at specific intervals primarily in 
response to a legitimate self-stabilization accept event at the 
node. 
 
The time difference between interdependent consecutive 
events is expressed in terms of the minimum event-response 
delay, D, and network imprecision, d.  As a result, the 
approach presented here is expressed as a self-stabilization 
of the system as a function of the expected time separation 
between the consecutive Affirm messages, ∆AA.  To 
guarantee that a message from a good node is received by all 
other good nodes before a subsequent message is 
transmitted, ∆AA is constrained such that ∆AA ≥ (D + d).  
Unless stated otherwise, all time dependent parameters of 
this protocol are measured locally and expressed as 
functions of ∆AA. 
 
Three fundamental parameters characterize the self-
stabilization protocol presented here, namely K, D, and d.  
The number of faulty nodes, F, the number of good nodes, 
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G, and the remaining parameters that are subsequently 
enumerated are derived parameters and are based on these 
three fundamental parameters.  Furthermore, except for K, 
F, G, TA and TR, which are integer numbers, other 
parameters are real numbers.  In particular, ∆AA is used as a 
threshold value for monitoring of proper timing of incoming 
and outgoing Affirm messages.  The derived parameters TA = 
G - 1 and TR = F + 1 are used as thresholds in conjunction 
with the Affirm and Resync messages, respectively. 
 
The assessment results of the monitored nodes are utilized 
by the node in the self-stabilization process.  The node 
consists of a state machine and a set of (K-1) monitors.  The 
state machine has two states, Restore state (T) and 
Maintain state (M), that reflect the current state of the node 
in the system as shown in Figure 2, where, Resync messages 
are represented as R and Affirm messages are represented as 
A. 
 A
MT
R
R, A A
 
Figure 2.  The node state machine. 
 
2.1. Transitory Conditions 
The transitory conditions enable the node to migrate to the 
Maintain state and are defined as: 
1. The node is in the Restore state,  
2. At least 2F accept events in as many ∆AA intervals have 
occurred after the node entered the Restore state, 
3. No valid Resync messages are received for the last 
accept event. 
 
2.2. Message Validity 
Starting from the last transmission of the Resync message 
consecutive Affirm messages are transmitted at ∆AA intervals, 
where ∆AA ≥ (D + d).  In [9, 10] ∆RR,min is defined to be 
∆RR,min = 2F∆AA + 1 clock ticks.  At the receiving nodes, the 
following definitions hold: 
 
– A message (Resync or Affirm) from a given source is 
valid if it is the first message from that source.  A 
message shall remain valid for the duration of one ∆AA. 
– An Affirm message from a given source is early if it 
arrives earlier than (∆AA - d) after previous valid 
message (Resync or Affirm) from the same source. 
– A Resync message from a given source is early if it 
arrives earlier than ∆RR,min after previous valid Resync 
message from the same source. 
– An Affirm message from a given source is valid if it is 
not early. 
– A Resync message from a given source is valid if it is 
not early. 
 
2.3. System Assumption 
1. The cause of transient faults has dissipated. 
2. All good nodes actively participate in the self-
stabilization process and correctly execute the 
protocol. 
3. At most F of the nodes are faulty. 
4. The source of a message is distinctly identifiable by 
the receivers from other sources of messages. 
5. A message sent by a good node will be received 
and processed by all other good nodes within ∆AA, 
where ∆AA ≥ (D + d). 
6. The initial values of the state and all variables of a 
node can be set to any arbitrary value within their 
corresponding range (In an implementation, it is 
expected that some local capabilities exist to 
enforce type consistency of all variables.) 
 
2.4. Protocol Functions 
Two functions InvalidAffirm() and InvalidResync() are used 
by the monitors.  The InvalidAffirm() function determines 
whether or not a received Affirm message is valid.  The 
InvalidResync() function determines if a received Resync 
message is valid.  When either of these functions returns a 
true value, it is indicative of an unexpected behavior by the 
corresponding source node. 
 
The Accept() function is used by the state machine of the 
node in conjunction with the threshold value TA = G - 1.  
When at least TA valid messages (Resync or Affirm) have 
been received, this function returns a true value indicating 
that an accept event has occurred and such an event has also 
taken place in at least F other good nodes.  When a node 
accepts, it consumes all valid messages used in the accept 
process by the corresponding function.  Consumption of a 
message is the process by which a monitor is informed that 
its stored message, if it existed and was valid, has been 
utilized by the state machine. 
 
The Retry() function determines if at least TR other nodes 
have transitioned out of the Maintain state, where TR = F +1. 
When at least TR valid Resync messages from as many nodes 
have been received, this function returns a true value 
indicating that at least one good node has transitioned to the 
Restore state.  This function is used to transition from the 
Maintain state to the Restore state. 
 
The TransitoryConditionsMet() function determines proper 
timing of the transition from the Restore state to the 
Maintain state.  This function keeps track of the accept 
events, by incrementing the Accept_Event_Counter, to 
determine if at least 2F accept events in as many ∆AA 
intervals have occurred.  It returns a true value when the 
transitory conditions are met. 
 
 4 
The TimeOutRestore() function uses PT as a boundary value 
and asserts a timeout condition when the value of the 
State_Timer has reached PT.  Such a timeout triggers the 
node to reengage in another round of self-stabilization 
process.  This function is used when the node is in the 
Restore state. 
 
The TimeOutMaintain() function uses PM as a boundary 
value and asserts a timeout condition when the value of the 
State_Timer has reached PM.  Such a timeout triggers the 
node to reengage in another round of synchronization.  This 
function is used when the node is in the Maintain state. 
 
In addition to the above functions, the state machine utilizes 
the TimeOutAcceptEvent() function.  This function is used to 
regulate the transmission time of the next Affirm message.  
This function maintains a DeltaAA_Timer by incrementing it 
once per local clock tick and once it reaches the 
transmission time of the next Affirm message, ∆AA, it returns 
a true value.  In response to such a timeout, the node 
broadcasts an Affirm message. 
 
2.5. The Self-Stabilizing Clock Synchronization Problem 
To simplify the presentation of this protocol, it is assumed 
that all time references are with respect to a real time t0, 
where t0 = 0 when the system assumptions are satisfied, and  
for all t > t0 the system operates within the system 
assumptions.  Let  
 
• C be the bound on the maximum convergence time,  
• ∆Local_Timer(t), for real time t, the maximum 
difference of values of the local timers of any two 
good nodes Ni and Nj, where Ni, Nj ∈ KG, and KG is 
the set of all good nodes, and  
• ∆Precision, also referred to as self-stabilization 
precision, the guaranteed upper bound on the 
maximum separation between the local timers of 
any two good nodes Ni and Nj in the presence of a 
maximum of F faulty nodes, where Ni, Nj ∈ KG. 
 
A good node Ni resets its variable Local_Timeri periodically 
but at different points in time than other good nodes.  The 
difference of local timers of all good nodes at time t, 
∆Local_Timer(t), is determined by the following equation while 
recognizing the variations in the values of the Local_Timeri 
across all good nodes. 
∆Local_Timer(t) = min ((Local_Timermax(t) – Local_Timermin(t)),  
       (Local_Timermax(t - ∆Precision) –  
        Local_Timermin(t - ∆Precision))), 
where, 
Local_Timermin(x) = min ({Local_Timeri(x) | Ni ∈ KG}),  
Local_Timermax(x) = max ({Local_Timeri(x) | Ni ∈ KG}),  
 
and, there exist C and ∆Precision: 
Convergence:  ∆Local_Timer(C) ≤ ∆Precision  
Closure:          ∀ t, t ≥ C, ∆Local_Timer(t) ≤ ∆Precision 
 
The values of C, ∆Precision, and the maximum value for 
Local_Timeri, Local_Timer_Max, are determined to be: 
 
C = (2PT + PM) ∆AA, 
∆Precision = (3F - 1) ∆AA - D + ∆Drift, 
Local_Timer_Max = PT + PM,  
 
and the amount of drift from the initial precision is given by 
 
∆Drift = ((1+ρ) - 1/(1+ρ)) PEffective ∆AA. 
 
Note that since Local_Timer_Max > PT /2 and since the 
Local_Timer is reset after reaching Local_Timer_Max 
(worst case wraparound), a trivial solution is not possible. 
 
2.6. The Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant Self-Stabilizing Protocol 
for Distributed Clock Synchronization Systems 
The presented protocol is described in Figure 3 and 
consists of a state machine and a set of monitors which 
execute once every local oscillator tick. 
 
 
Monitor: 
case (incoming message from the corresponding node) 
{Resync: 
if InvalidResync() then 
Invalidate the message 
else 
Validate and store the message,  
Set state status of the source. 
Affirm:  
if InvalidAffirm() then 
Invalidate the message 
else 
Validate and store the message.  
Other:   
Do nothing. 
} // case 
 
 
Figure 3.a.  The self-stabilization protocol. 
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Node: 
case (state of the node) 
{Restore:  
if TimeOutRestore() then  
Transmit Resync message, 
Reset State_Timer, 
Reset DeltaAA_Timer, 
Reset Accept_Event_Counter, 
Stay in Restore state, 
elsif TimeOutAcceptEvent() then 
Transmit Affirm message, 
Reset DeltaAA_Timer, 
if Accept() then  
Consume valid messages, 
Clear state status of the sources, 
Increment Accept_Event_Counter, 
if TransitoryConditionsMet() then 
Reset State_Timer, 
Go to Maintain state, 
else 
Stay in Restore state. 
 else 
Stay in Restore state., 
else 
Stay in Restore state. 
 
Maintain: 
if TimeOutMaintain() or Retry() then 
Transmit Resync message, 
Reset State_Timer, 
Reset DeltaAA_Timer, 
Reset Accept_Event_Counter, 
Go to Restore state,  
elsif TimeOutAcceptEvent() then 
if Accept() then  
Consume valid messages., 
if (State_Timer = ∆Precision) 
Reset Local_Timer., 
Transmit Affirm message, 
Reset DeltaAA_Timer, 
Stay in Maintain state,  
else 
Stay in Maintain state. 
} // case 
 
 
Figure 3.b.  The self-stabilization protocol. 
 
2.7. Semantics of the pseudo-code 
• Indentation is used to show a block of sequential 
statements. 
• ‘,’ is used to separate sequential statements. 
• ‘.’ is used to end a statement. 
• ‘.,’ is used to mark the end of a statement and at the 
same time to separate it from other sequential 
statements. 
3. MECHANICAL VERIFICATION 
Several approaches were explored toward the mechanical 
verification of the correctness of this protocol.  This effort 
started by simulation of the known cases and grew into 
model checking of all scenarios using various model-
checking tools. 
 
3.1. SMV  
The Cadence Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) [1] provided 
the desired capability.  SMV allows the designers to 
formally verify temporal logic properties of finite state 
systems.  Developers use SMV to verify the design for all 
possible input sequences, instead of a chosen selection of 
sequences as in simulation. 
 
The initial model of the 4-node system required more 
memory for the construction of the state space than the 
available 2GB of memory.  The initial state space for the 
basic case and in the presence of a Byzantine faulty node is 
given by (Good_Node * Monitors3 * Channel3 * 
Faulty_Node)3, or approximately 4x1046 for K = 4, F = 1, G 
= 3, D = 1, d = 0, ∆AA = 1, ρ = 0, ∆Precision = 1, and PT = PM = 
P = 10.  The intuitive solution to this problem was to 
provide more memory.   The amount of memory was 
increased to 4GB, the maximum capacity of the PC.  There 
is a hardware limitation on the amount of memory that can 
be added to a given system.  Furthermore, although 
additional memory eased the state space construction, it did 
not eliminate the problem.  As a result, many abstractions 
were made and a number of reduction techniques were 
devised to circumvent the state space explosion problem.  
Some of the techniques used are explained here.  The 
optimized state space for the basic case and is given by 
(Good_Node * Monitors3 * Faulty_Node)3, or 
approximately 5x1024.  Nevertheless, the protocol can now 
be exhaustively model checked for a 4-node system.  A brief 
history of this effort is reported in [12]. 
 
4. MODELING SIMPLIFICATIONS AND 
ABSTRACTIONS 
The local measures within each node are used to keep track 
of timing of the self-stabilization events.  Although the 
derived parameters are defined with respect to the real time, 
ultimately, in implementations they have to be translated 
into discrete values.  Discretization of the derived 
parameters is performed using the ceiling operation.  In this 
protocol, all local variables and watchdog timers are 
discretized and represented by integer values.  These local 
variables are, therefore, measured with respect to the local 
clock. 
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The state space for modeling of the general case of this 
protocol far exceeds the available 4GB memory.  Thus, in a 
bottom-up approach, a basic case is modeled such that the 
number of parameters needed are minimal and the range of 
each parameter is at its minimum.  A distributed system 
tolerating as many as F Byzantine faults requires a network 
size of more than 3F nodes [3, 11] to maintain synchrony.  
In other words, to guarantee the closure property a minimum 
of 3F+1 nodes are needed.  Therefore, the basic case is 
defined as the minimum number of nodes that can self-
stabilize in the presence of at least one Byzantine faulty 
node and with all other parameters at their minimum.  Thus, 
for the basic case, the number of nodes in the system K = 4, 
the upper bound on the number of faulty nodes F = 1, and 
the minimum number of good nodes, G, is determined to be 
G = K - F = 3 nodes. 
 
Other aspects of the basic case are topological issues.  The 
logical topology is a fully connected graph of a 4-node 
system, where each node is directly connected to another 
node via a dedicated bi-directional channel.  As shown in 
Figure 1, each node and the source of a message is distinctly 
identifiable by other nodes.  The physical topology can be 
either a fully connected graph, similar to the logical 
topology, or equivalently, a graph where a message from a 
source is broadcast to all other nodes at the same time.  For 
the basic case, broadcast is modeled using a single variable. 
 
Recall that all parameters are defined as integers.  The event 
response delay, D, and the network imprecision, d, are 
chosen to be at their minimum values of 1 and 0 clock ticks, 
respectively.  As a result, ∆AA is at its minimum of one clock 
tick.  This simplification, consequently, implies that the 
logical timers of the good nodes are in phase with each 
other.  Note that this simplification does not imply that the 
nodes are synchronized with each other.  To further 
minimize the state space, the clock drift rate, ρ, is chosen to 
be zero.  This simplification guarantees that the nodes’ 
State_Timer will remain in phase with each other.  Model 
checking of the system with ∆AA > 1 where the logical timers 
of the good nodes are in phase with respect to each other, is 
equivalent to model checking for ∆AA = 1 and the basic case. 
 However, model checking of the system with ∆AA > 1, 
where the logical timers of the good nodes are out-of-phase 
with respect to each other, poses a greater challenge. 
 
We recognize that the choice of the value for network 
imprecision, d = 0, is a nonrealistic assumption.  
Nonetheless, these simplifications are necessary in order to 
reduce the state space to a manageable size.  Furthermore, 
we believe that the basic case specifies the set of necessary 
conditions that all candidate solutions to this problem should 
satisfy.  As an example, the flaw in [7] was discovered as a 
direct result of applying that protocol to the basic case as 
documented in [8].  We also acknowledge that satisfying the 
basic case does not necessarily imply that the candidate 
solution solves the general case of this problem. 
In order to expedite the self-stabilization process, in general, 
and in order to minimize the state space for model checking 
purposes, in particular, the convergence time has to be 
minimized.  It was argued in [9, 10] that PT,min = 10 and PM 
≥ PT.  Although the maximum duration of the Restore state, 
PT, can be any value larger than the required minimum, PT is 
chosen to be PT,min.  In order to minimize the state space, PM 
is chosen to be equal to PT.  Therefore, synchronization 
period, P, for the basic case is chosen to be P = PM = PT = 
10.  For the basic case, the parameters d and ρ are chosen to 
be zeros. In other words, there are no variations in the 
communication delay and the nodes do not drift with respect 
to each other.  Model checking of the system with larger 
values for PM and PT is equivalent to model checking for P = 
PM = PT = 10. 
 
A system clock, SCLK, is introduced to keep track of 
passage of time from the global perspective.  The SCLK is 
managed at the system level and is incremented per SMV 
cycle.  Each node has a logical clock, Local_Timer, that 
locally keeps track of time.  This logical clock is used to 
measure the convergence time, C, as well as the self-
stabilization precision, ∆Precision, across good nodes (i.e. 
external view of the system).  Since for the basic case the 
logical timers (State_Timer and Local_Timer) of the good 
nodes  are  in  phase  with each other and since ∆AA = 1 and 
ρ = 0, a single SCLK suffices to drive timers of all nodes.  
The use of a single SCLK also eliminates redundancies at the 
node level for replicating behavior of local oscillators and, 
thus, reduces the state space substantially.  The SCLK, 
therefore, binds the whole system together, providing a 
means for advancing the State_Timer and Local_Timer at 
the node and an external view of the system at any time.  
Although the use of a single clock does not imply synchrony 
at the nodes, it does imply that the nodes are in phase with 
each other at the State_Timer and Local_Timer levels.  
However, due to the inherent randomness of the operation of 
the model checkers, the order of execution of the nodes is 
not predetermined.  Since there is no control over the order 
of transmission of messages and the start of execution of the 
nodes at each model checker cycle, the nodes potentially 
broadcast and receive messages out of order of issuance. 
5. MODELING THE SYSTEM  
To accommodate for proper timing of operations of the 
system, variables are needed to keep track of passage of 
time in each monitor and node.  Introduction of such 
variables exponentially increases the state space beyond the 
4GB available memory.  For the general case of modeling 
this protocol, a Transmit_Timer is needed at every node to 
regulate proper timing of outgoing messages.  A 
Receive_Timer is needed at each monitor to keep track of 
proper timing of incoming messages from its corresponding 
source [9, 10].  As ∆AA increases linearly, the state space 
associated with Transmit_Timer and Receive_Timer 
increases exponentially. 
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There are two different ways of modeling this protocol, 
either all operations are done sequentially in one big 
module, or the operations are partitioned between the node 
and its monitors.  In a sequential model, all activities take 
place within the same scope and during one clock tick.  Such 
a model is not readily scalable.  A modular model is readily 
scalable, but requires coordinated interactions between the 
node and its monitors.  Either the monitors have to inform 
the node of the changes in their current status or the node 
has to poll the status of the monitors to stay current with the 
changes in the system.  In turn, the monitors have to be 
informed by the node to take certain actions at the 
appropriate time.  Since the node and its monitors operate 
with respect to a local clock, there will be a delay in a 
monitor’s response to the node’s commands.  The 
interactions between the node and its monitors can be 
coordinated either based on time or by passing a control 
token in a master-target fashion. 
 
In this SMV model, a modular approach is employed where 
the interactions between a node and its monitors are 
coordinated based on time.  Also, to minimize the state 
space both positive and negative edges of the SCLK are 
used.  In particular, the nodes operate at the positive edge of 
the SCLK while the monitors operate at the negative edge of 
the SCLK.  For ∆AA = 1, operating at the positive edge of the 
SCLK, the nodes are guaranteed not to violate the minimum 
transmission time requirement for their consecutive output 
messages.  Therefore, for the basic case there is no need for 
the Transmit_Timer variable and, consequently, no need for 
the Receive_Timer variable.  Thus, further reduction in 
memory and computation requirements is achieved.  Since 
∆AA = D = 1 and ∆Drift = 0,  
 
∆Precision = (3F - 1) ∆AA - D + ∆Drift = 2∆AA - D + 0 = ∆AA, and  
∆Precision = ∆AA = 1. 
 
Since ∆AA = 1 and PT = PM = P = 10,  
C = (2PT + PM) ∆AA = 3P = 30∆AA = 30. 
 
6. MODELS AND DATA STRUCTURES 
In this section, the system components are modeled and 
subsequently their data structures are defined.  Detailed 
descriptions of these constructs and the SMV code of the 
basic case are reported in [12]. 
 
6.1. Modeling Faulty Nodes 
The fault tolerant requirement of K ≥ 3F+1 implies that the 
system of 4 nodes can tolerate up to one Byzantine faulty 
node.  Therefore, the system is devised to consist of 3 good 
nodes and one faulty node.  In Figure 4 the faulty node, N4, 
is shown in gray. 
 
      
 N2
N3N4
N1
 
Figure 4.  A 4-node system with a faulty node. 
 
To properly portray the behavior of the faulty node, Figure 4 
needs to be redrawn.  Figure 5 portrays a symmetric faulty 
node and a crash-silent node that is a special case of a 
symmetric faulty node where every good node, N1 through 
N3, have the same view of the faulty node, N4. 
 
      
 N2
N3N4
N1
       
 N2
N3
N1
 
  Symmetric faulty           Crash-silent  
 
Figure 5.  A 4-node system with a symmetric faulty node. 
 
Modeling of an asymmetric (Byzantine) faulty node is more 
complex than the symmetric faulty node.  The malicious 
nature of the Byzantine faulty node is such that as if each 
good node is affected independently by the Byzantine faulty 
node.  Such behavior of the Byzantine faulty node is 
depicted in Figure 6 by replicating the effects of the 
Byzantine faulty node, N4, for each good node N1 through 
N3.  Furthermore, the Byzantine faulty behavior modeled 
here is a node with arbitrarily malicious behavior.  Defined 
earlier as permanent Byzantine faulty, the Byzantine faulty 
node is allowed to influence other nodes at every clock tick 
and at all time. 
 
      
 
N2
N3N4,3
N1N4,1 N4,2
 
Figure 6.  A 4-node system with an asymmetric (Byzantine) 
faulty node. 
 
Since the behavior of a faulty node is not the same as a good 
node, modeling of a faulty node requires rethinking.  Proper 
modeling of faulty nodes can potentially result in 
considerable state space reduction.  It particular, a Byzantine 
faulty node may transmit any one of the three possible 
messages, namely, NONE, Resync, or Affirm at any time.  
Additionally, unlike the good nodes, local state of a faulty 
node does not play a role in the operation of this protocol.  
Therefore, the faulty node is modeled as a special node only 
capable of randomly producing any one of the three 
messages at any clock tick and without any internal state.  
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Consequently, the faulty node’s data structure has only one 
parameter, Message_Out.  The range of values that this 
element can hold is enumerated as follows. 
 
Message_Out = {NONE, Resync, Affirm} 
 
6.2. Modeling Monitors 
The assessment results of the monitored nodes are utilized 
by the node in the self-stabilization process.  The node 
consists of a state machine and a set of (K -1) monitors.  The 
state machine describes the collective behavior of the node, 
Ni, utilizing assessment results from its monitors, M1 .. Mi-1, 
Mi+1 .. MK as shown in Figure 7, where Mj is the monitor for 
the corresponding node Nj. 
 
   
 
Node i 
State 
Machine
From Nk
From Ni+1
From N1
To other nodes
Mi+1
Mk
From Ni-1 Mi-1
M1
Node i 
 
 
Figure 7.  Interaction of the node’s state machine and its 
monitors. 
 
A monitor keeps track of activities of its corresponding 
source node.  A monitor detects proper sequence and 
timeliness of the received messages from its corresponding 
source node.  A monitor reads, evaluates, time stamps, 
validates, and stores only the last message it received from 
that node.  A monitor also keeps track of the state of the 
source node by keeping track of received Resync messages, 
separately.  The monitor’s data structure consists of 
Last_Message, Receive_Timer, Message_Valid, 
Delta_RR_Timer, and Received_Resync.  The Last_Message 
element represents the last valid message received from the 
corresponding source node.  The Receive_Timer element 
represents the time interval between arrival of the last two 
messages from the corresponding source node.  As discussed 
in the previous section, there is no need to model this 
element for the basic case.  The Message_Valid element 
indicates whether or not the last message received was valid. 
 The Delta_RR_Timer element represents the duration of 
time between any two consecutive valid Resync messages 
from the corresponding source.  The Received_Resync 
element indicates whether the last valid message received 
was a Resync message.  The range of values that these 
elements can hold is enumerated as follows. 
 
Last_Message = {Resync, Affirm} 
Receive_Timer = {0 .. (∆AA+1)}  
Message_Valid = {0, 1} 
Delta_RR_Timer = {0 .. (PT + PM)}  
Received_Resync = {0, 1} 
 
In this modular SMV model, coordinated interactions 
between the node’s state machine and the monitors require 
sharing some of the node’s status with its monitors.  In 
particular, the variables Node_State, Node_State_Timer, and 
Accept are used to reflect the changes in the State of the 
node as it transitions through the state machine.  In contrast, 
the monitors’ Message_valid, Received_Resync, and 
Last_Message are used by the node’s state machine in 
evaluating the protocol functions and determining the proper 
transitory conditions. 
 
The functions InvalidAffirm() and InvalidResync() are 
modeled as part of the Message_Valid by examining the 
timing of received messages. 
 
6.3.  Modeling Good Nodes  
The state machine describes the collective behavior of the 
node, Ni, utilizing assessment results from its monitors, M1 .. 
Mi-1, Mi+1 .. MK as shown in Figure 7.  The good node’s data 
structure consists of State, Accept_Events, State_Timer, 
Local_Timer, Transmit_Timer, and Message_Out.  The 
State element represents the current state of the node.  The 
Accept_Events element is the count of accept events since 
the node entered the Restore state.  The State_Timer element 
represents the duration of current state of the node.  The 
Local_Timer element represents the duration of time since 
the node has been synchronized with other good nodes.  The 
Transmit_Timer element represents the passage of time 
since the transmission of the last message by the node.  As 
discussed in the previous section, there is no need to model 
this element for the basic case.  The Message_Out element 
represents the out going message of the node.  The range of 
values that these elements can hold is enumerated as 
follows. 
 
State  = {Restore, Maintain} 
Accept_Events = {0 .. (F+1)} 
State_Timer = {0 .. PM} 
Local_Timer = {0 .. (PT + PM)} 
Transmit_Timer = {0 .. (∆AA+1)} 
Message_Out = {NONE, Resync, Affirm} 
 
6.4.  Modeling Communication Channels  
The communication channel’s data structure consists of 
Message_In, Comm_Delay, and Message_Out.  The 
Message_In element represents the message deposited by 
the transmitting node.  The Comm_Delay represents the 
amount of delay associated with the channel.  The 
Message_Out element represents the delayed message being 
delivered to the destination nodes.  The range of values that 
these elements can hold is enumerated as follows. 
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Message_In    = {NONE, Resync, Affirm} 
Comm_Delay = {1 .. ∆AA} 
Message_Out = {NONE, Resync, Affirm} 
 
Since for the basic case ∆AA is one clock tick, a deposited 
message on a communication channel is available to the 
destination nodes at the next clock tick.  Therefore, a 
channel of depth one suffices.  Also since a message is 
broadcast to other nodes, a single variable suffices to 
represent the communication channel from a node to all 
other nodes.  Therefore, in order to reduce the state space, 
the communication channel is modeled implicitly and as part 
of the node’s out going message instead of introducing a 
new SMV module for the channels. 
 
7. PROPOSITIONS 
Computational tree logic (CTL), a temporal logic, is used to 
express properties of a system in this context.  CTL uses 
atomic propositions as its building blocks to make 
statements about the states of a system.  CTL then combines 
these propositions into formulas using logical and temporal 
operators with quantification over runs.  The CTL operators 
have the following format. 
 
Q T 
there exists an execution E X next 
for all executions  A F finally  
(eventually) 
G globally 
U until 
 
 
In this section the claims of convergence and closure 
properties as well as the claims of maximum convergence 
time and determinism of the protocol for the basic case are 
examined.  Although in the description of the protocol these 
properties are stated separately, nevertheless, they are 
examined via one CTL proposition.  Validation of this 
general CTL proposition requires examination of a number 
of underlying propositions.  In particular, since ∆Local_Timer(t) 
is defined in terms of the Local_Timer of the good nodes 
and the Local_Timer is defined in terms of the State_Timer, 
examination of the properties that described proper behavior 
of the State_Timer take precedence.  As a result, in this 
section, the four underlying propositions are examined 
followed by the general proposition that validates the 
convergence and closure properties of the protocol as well 
as the claims of maximum convergence time and 
determinism. 
 
The following properties are described with respect to only 
one good node, namely Good_Node_1.  Since all good 
nodes are identical, due to the symmetry, the result of the 
propositions equally similarly applies to other good nodes. 
 
Proposition 1:  This property specifies whether or not the 
State_Timer of a good node takes on a given value in its 
range infinitely often, for instance, its maximum value of P.  
The expected result for this proposition is a true value. 
 
 
AF (Good_Node_1.State_Timer = P) 
 
 
Examining the negation of this property is expected to 
produce a false value.  This proposition verifies that the 
State_Timer of a good node cannot never reach a given 
value. 
 
 
EG !(Good_Node_1.State_Timer = P) 
 
 
Similar properties apply to the Local_Timer, but within its 
expected range. 
 
Proposition 2:  This property specifies whether or not the 
State_Timer of a good node takes on all values in its range 
infinitely often.  In other words, it verifies that the model 
does not deadlock.  Furthermore, the value of the 
State_Timer of a good node at the next clock tick is different 
from its current value and is its expected next value in the 
sequence of 0 to P.  The expected result for this proposition 
is a true value. 
 
 
AG (((SCLK = 1) & (Good_Node_1.State_Timer = i)) ->  
AX ((SCLK=0) & ((Good_Node_1.State_Timer = i) | 
(Good_Node_1.State_Timer = i+1)))) & 
AG (((SCLK = 1) &  
(Good_Node_1.State_Timer = P)) ->  
AX ((SCLK = 0) &  
(Good_Node_1.State_Timer = 0))) 
 
For all i = 0 .. (P-1) 
 
 
Examining the negation of this property is expected to 
produce a false value.  This proposition verifies that the next 
value of the State_Timer of a good node cannot be the same 
as its current value.  In other words, its value always 
advances within the expected range. 
 
 
EG (((SCLK = 1) & (Good_Node_1.State_Timer = i)) ->  
EX ((SCLK = 0) & (Good_Node_1.State_Timer = i))) |  
 
For all i = 0 .. (P-1) 
 
 
Similar properties apply to the Local_Timer, but within its 
expected range. 
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Proposition 3:  This property specifies whether or not time 
advances and the amount of time elapsed, Elapsed_Time, 
has advanced beyond the predicted convergence time, 
Convergence_Time.  The expected result for this proposition 
is a true value. 
 
 
Elapsed_Time:= (Global_Clock >= Convergence_Time) ; 
AF (Elapsed_Time) 
 
 
The Global_Clock is a measure of elapsed time from the 
beginning of the operation and with respect to the real time, 
i.e. external view.  The Elapsed_Time is indicative of the 
Global_Clock reaching its target maximum value of 
Convergence_Time. 
 
 
 
init (Global_Clock) := 0 ; 
next (Global_Clock) :=  
case 
(SCLK = 1) & (Global_Clock < Convergence_Time) : 
Global_Clock + 1 ; 
1 : Global_Clock ; -- no-op 
esac ; 
 
Elapsed_Time := (Global_Clock >= Convergence_Time) ; 
 
 
Proposition 4:  Similar to Proposition 2, this property 
specifies whether or not the State_Timer of a good node 
takes on all values in its range infinitely often but beyond 
the convergence time, i.e. after Elapsed_Time has become 
true.  The expected result for this proposition is a true value. 
Examining the negation of this property is expected to 
produce a false value.  Similar properties apply to the 
Local_Timer, but within its expected range. 
 
 
AF (Elapsed_Time) & 
AG (((SCLK = 1) & (Elapsed_Time) & 
(Good_Node_1.State_Timer = i)) ->  
AX ((SCLK=0) & ((Good_Node_1.State_Timer= i) | 
(Good_Node_1.State_Timer = i+1)))) & 
AG (((SCLK = 1) & (Elapsed_Time) & 
(Good_Node_1.State_Timer = j)) ->  
AX ((SCLK = 0) &   
(Good_Node_1.State_Timer = j+1))) & 
AG (((SCLK = 1) & (Elapsed_Time) & 
(Good_Node_1.State_Timer = P)) ->  
AX ((SCLK = 0) &  (Good_Node_1.State_Timer = 0))) 
 
For all i = 0 .. 4 
For all j = 5 .. (P-1) 
 
 
Proposition 5: The convergence and closure properties are 
described in Section 2.5.  This proposition encompasses the 
criteria for the convergence and the closure properties as 
well as the claims of maximum convergence time and 
determinism.  This proposition specifies whether or not the 
system will converge to the predicted precision after the 
elapse of convergence time, Elapsed_Time, and whether or 
not it will remain within that precision thereafter.  The 
expected result for this property is a true value. 
 
 
AF (Elapsed_Time) & 
AG (Elapsed_Time -> All_Within_Precision) & 
AG ((Elapsed_Time & All_Within_Precision) ->  
AX (Elapsed_Time & All_Within_Precision)) 
 
 
The proper value of the All_Within_Precision is determined 
by measuring the difference of maximum and minimum 
values of the Local_Timers of all good nodes for the current 
SCLK tick and in conjunction with the result from the 
previous SCLK tick.  The expected difference of 
Local_Timers is the predicted precision bound. 
 
The negation of the above proposition is listed below and 
the expected result is a false value.  This property specifies 
that after the elapse of convergence time, Elapsed_Time, 
whether or not the system will not converge or if it 
converges, whether or not it drifts apart beyond the expected 
precision bound. 
 
 
AF (Elapsed_Time) &  
AG (Elapsed_Time -> All_Within_Precision) &  
AG ((Elapsed_Time & All_Within_Precision) ->  
EX (! All_Within_Precision)) 
 
 
8. RESULTS 
This SMV model checking effort was performed on a PC 
with 4GB of memory running Linux.  SMV was able to 
examine all possible scenarios and the basic case of the 
protocol was model checked.  The model checking results 
are listed in the following tables.  The negation of a property 
is denoted by using the unary operator ‘!’. 
 
The Byzantine faulty behavior modeled here is a node with 
arbitrarily malicious behavior.  The Byzantine faulty node is 
allowed to influence other nodes at every clock tick and at 
all time as depicted in Figure 6.  Regardless of the nature of 
the faulty node, no assumptions are made about the initial 
internal status of the nodes, the monitors, and the system.  
For instance, a node can wake up in the Maintain state and 
transmit a Resync, message.  Although such behavior from a 
good node is not exhibited during normal operation, 
nevertheless, it is allowed for the random start up.  Such a 
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model is for the weakest assumptions about the behavior of 
the faulty nodes, the internal state of data structures of the 
nodes, the monitors, and the system as a whole, and thus 
produces the strongest results. 
 
Table 1.  Results in the presence of a Byzantine faulty node. 
 
Proposition Result Time(sec) Mem(GB) 
1 T 1311 1.2 
1! F 1318 1.2 
2 T 0.2 0.012 
2! F 8866 1.2 
3 T 0.04 - 
4 T 19 0.056 
4! F 4702 1.2 
5 T 2313 2 
5! F 3413 2.1 
 
Table 1 lists the results of model checking of the basic case 
for the stated propositions 1 through 5, where the duration of 
the Maintain and Restore states, PM and PT, are  chosen to 
be PM = PT = Period = 10 and the maximum convergence 
time, Convergence_Time, is 30.  As shown in Table 1, the 
maximum memory usage is about 2GB after applying the 
state space reduction techniques.  The amount of memory 
used and processing time needed depend on the BDD 
construction and the nature of the query.  Although 
verification of the stated propositions suffices to validate the 
claims of correctness and determinism of the protocol and in 
the presence of a Byzantine fault, the propositions are 
further examined for other, and hence less severe, types of 
faults.  For the following scenarios, the values for the Period 
and Convergence_Time are the same as for Table 1. 
 
8.1.  Symmetric Fault 
In this case, all good nodes receive identical messages from 
a single faulty node as depicted in Figure 5.  The faulty node 
still behaves randomly, but its effect at the receiving nodes 
is identical.  As shown in Table 2, the maximum available 
memory is used to model check this case. Due to the BDD 
construction, the memory usage is far more than the 
Byzantine faulty case. 
 
Table 2.  Results in the presence of a symmetric faulty node. 
 
Proposition Result Time(sec) Mem(GB) 
1 T 2573 2.0 
2 T 0.2 0.012 
3 T 0.04 - 
4 T 62 0.160 
5 T 3975 3.5* 
 
*
 Of  4GB available memory, maximum memory utilized by 
SMV is approximately 3.5GB. 
 
8.2.  Crash-Silent Fault, a.k.a. Stuck-at NONE Message 
This case is a special case of the symmetric faulty node 
where the faulty node is not transmitting any messages.  This 
case is modeled such that the associated message from the 
faulty node to all good nodes is a NONE message signifying 
lack of transmission by the faulty node.  This case is 
depicted in Figure 5. 
 
Table 3.  Results in the presence of a symmetric faulty node. 
 
Proposition Result Time(sec) Mem(GB) 
1 T 28 0.045 
2 T 0.15 - 
3 T 0.04 - 
4 T 6 0.015 
5 T 365 0.34 
 
8.3. Stuck-at Resync Message  
This case is another special case of the symmetric faulty 
node where all good nodes receive identical messages from 
a single faulty node.  The faulty node transmits the same 
message to all good nodes all the same time. 
 
Table 4.  Results in the presence of a symmetric faulty node. 
 
Proposition Result Time(sec) Mem(GB) 
1 T 81 0.25 
2 T 0.15 - 
3 T 0.04 - 
4 T 7 0.025 
5 T 605 0.61 
 
8.4. Stuck-at Affirm Message  
This case is another special case of the symmetric faulty 
node where all good nodes receive identical messages from 
a single faulty node.  The faulty node transmits the same 
message to all good nodes all the same time. 
 
Table 5.  Results in the presence of a symmetric faulty node. 
 
Proposition Result Time(sec) Mem(GB) 
1 T 19 0.033 
2 T 0.15 - 
3 T 0.04 - 
4 T 5 0.017 
5 T 276 0.3 
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9. APPLICATIONS 
The proposed self-stabilizing protocol is expected to have 
many practical applications as well as many theoretical 
implications.  Embedded systems, distributed process 
control, synchronization, inherent fault tolerance which also 
includes Byzantine agreement, computer networks, the 
Internet, Internet applications, security, safety, automotive, 
aircraft, wired and wireless telecommunications, graph 
theoretic problems, leader election, time division multiple 
access (TDMA), and the SPIDER3 project [13, 14] at 
NASA-LaRC are a few examples.  These are some of the 
many areas of distributed systems that can use self-
stabilization in order to design more robust distributed 
systems. 
10. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
In this report a SMV model of a simplified model of a rapid 
Byzantine-fault-tolerant self-stabilizing protocol for 
distributed clock synchronization systems is presented.  The 
simplified model of the protocol is model checked using 
SMV where the entire state space is examined and proven to 
self-stabilize in the presence of one permanent Byzantine 
faulty node.  Furthermore, the simplified model of the 
protocol is proven to deterministically converge with a 
linear convergence time with respect to the self-stabilization 
period as predicted.  This protocol does not rely on any 
assumptions about the initial state of the system except for 
the presence of sufficient good nodes and no assumptions 
are made about the internal status of the nodes, the monitors, 
and the communication channels, thus making the weakest 
assumptions and producing the strongest results.  The 
Byzantine faulty behavior modeled here is a node with 
arbitrarily malicious behavior.  The Byzantine faulty node is 
allowed to influence other nodes at every clock tick and at 
all time.  The only constraint is that the interactions are 
restricted to defined interfaces. 
 
In this report, modeling challenges are addressed and 
abstraction techniques are illustrated.  The basic case is 
introduced that specifies the set of necessary conditions that 
all candidate solutions to this problem should satisfy.  The 
flaw in [7] was discovered as a direct result of applying that 
protocol to the basic case [8].  Although model checking 
results of the basic case of the protocol are promising, these 
results are not sufficient to confirm that the protocol solves 
the general case of this problem. 
 
Having mechanically verified a simplified model of the 
protocol, new hypothesis and conjectures are now practical 
for examination.  The current modeling approach is a very 
powerful tool for asking “What if?" questions that are 
difficult to answer either by manual analysis or by testing 
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real hardware.   
 
In our ongoing efforts toward the verification of this 
protocol for the general case, the SMV model of the 
simplified version of this protocol has been redesigned and 
restructured.  Also, the protocol has been redesigned and 
further simplified.  As a result, the current model requires 
less memory, making exploration of more complex and 
larger configurations easier.  Consequently, instances of the 
protocol representing the out-of-phase scenario where D > 1 
and d = 0, and hence, ∆AA > 1, have been explored.  Thus 
far, the analyses indicate that the protocol solves the out-of-
phase scenario.  Instances of the protocol representing a 
more complex system where D ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 have also 
been examined.  Thus far, the analyses indicate that the 
protocol is applicable to realizable systems and practical 
applications.  In addition, some instances of the protocol 
representing larger systems, where F > 1, have also been 
studied.  Thus far, the  analyses  indicate  that the protocol 
does not solve the general case of this  problem  where F > 
1.  A detailed explanation of the analyses is beyond the 
scope of this report.  Nevertheless, so far this model 
checking effort proved that, at a minimum, a deterministic 
solution for specific cases of this problem exists.  We expect 
that this protocol serves as the starting point toward finding 
a comprehensive solution for the general case.  In-depth 
analyses of the simplified version of this protocol for more 
complex and larger systems will be the subject of a 
subsequent report.  This analysis will include pitfalls, 
relevant counterexamples, an argument toward impossibility 
results, as well as scenarios where this protocol can be used 
as a basis for larger systems and, thus, for realizable systems 
and practical applications. 
 13 
REFERENCES  
[1] http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~modelcheck/smv.html 
[2] E. W. Dijkstra, “Self stabilizing systems in spite of 
distributed control,” Commun. ACM 17,643-644, 1974. 
[3] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, M. Pease, “The Byzantine 
General Problem,” ACM Transactions on Programming 
Languages and Systems, 4(3), pp. 382-401, July 1982. 
[4] T. K. Srikanth, and S. Toueg, “Optimal clock 
synchronization,” Journal of the ACM, 34(3), pp. 626–
645, July 1987. 
[5] J. L. Welch and N. Lynch, “A New Fault-Tolerant 
Algorithm for Clock Synchronization,” Information and 
Computation volume 77, number 1, pp.1-36, April 1988. 
[6] Sholmi Dolev and Jennifer L. Welch, “Self-Stabilizing 
Clock Synchronization in the Presence of Byzantine 
Faults,” Journal of the ACM, Vol.51, No. 5, pp. 780-799, 
September 2004. 
[7] A. Daliot, D. Dolev, and H. Parnas, “Linear Time 
Byzantine Self-Stabilizing Clock Synchronization,” 
Proceedings of 7th International Conference on Principles 
of Distributed Systems (OPODIS-2003), La Martinique, 
France, December 2003. 
[8] Mahyar R. Malekpour and R.Siminiceanu, “Comments on 
the “Byzantine Self-Stabilizing Pulse Synchronization” 
Protocol: Counterexamples,” NASA/TM-2006-213951, 
pp. 12, February 2006. 
[9] Mahyar R. Malekpour, “A Byzantine-Fault Tolerant Self-
Stabilizing Protocol for Distributed Clock Synchronization 
Systems,” NASA/TM-2006-214322, pp. 37, August 2006. 
[10] Mahyar R. Malekpour, “A Byzantine-Fault Tolerant 
Self-Stabilizing Protocol for Distributed Clock 
Synchronization Systems,” Eighth International 
Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of 
Distributed Systems (SSS06), November 2006. 
[11] L. Lamport and P.M. Melliar-Smith, “Synchronizing 
clocks in the presence of faults,” J. ACM, vol. 32, no. 1, 
pp. 52-78, 1985. 
[12] Mahyar R. Malekpour, “Model Checking a Byzantine-
Fault-Tolerant Self-Stabilizing Protocol for Distributed 
Clock Synchronization Systems,” NASA/TM-2007-
215083, pp. 36, November 2007. 
[13] Wilfredo Torres-Pomales, Mahyar R. Malekpour, Paul 
S. Miner, “ROBUS-2: A fault-tolerant broadcast 
communication system”.  NASA/TM-2005-213540, pp. 
201, March 2005. 
[14] Wilfredo Torres-Pomales, Mahyar R. Malekpour, Paul 
S. Miner, “Design of the Protocol Processor for the 
ROBUS-2 Communication System”.  NASA/TM-2005-
213934, pp. 252, November 2005. 
 
BIOGRAPHY 
 Mahyar R. Malekpour is a 
research engineer at NASA 
Langley Research Center, in 
Hampton, VA.  His research 
interests include fault-tolerance, 
distributed clock synchronization, 
algorithm development, and model 
checking.  He holds B.S. in 
computer engineering and an M.S. in electrical engineering 
from Old Dominion University. 
 
